reality by a change in perspective. We are now called upon to do the same, he argues, in order to establish an equilibrium between the local, concrete material existence in which we find ourselves, and the virtualized global world with which we interact and communicate "live" in real time, and that increasingly conditions and dominates our perceptual and conceptual faculties, the "techno-virtual spillover" again. In the past the economy was in a recognizable relationship to the human body and its productive capacities, but now, con l"accelerazione delle tecnologie propria del ventesimo secolo-ripensiamo a Marinetti, ai Futuristi-è evidente che c"è bisogno di un"economia politica della velocità. Il nostro è il mondo dell"accelerazione assoluta; … si è passati dalla velocità locale e relativa dei trasporti, a quella globale e assoluta delle trasmissioni ... (1999) 3 One recognizable upshot of the instantaneous transfer of data is that financial markets become unstable and seemingly subject to rapid collapse. For Virilio, absolute velocity can lead to absolute inertia, since "non abbiamo più bisogno di andare incontro alle cose, tutto arriva fino a noi." 4 He adds: "temo l"avvento di un senso di claustrofobia globale, e come ho detto questa è una delle grandi questioni ecologiche che riguardano le future generazioni. La terra è troppo piccola per la velocità assoluta." 5 However, in this initial foray into the concept, we regard such evocations of the velocities underpinning (future) world virtualization as partial in characterizing the contradictions of (contemporary) hyperworld(s). Perhaps hyperworld(s), then, can be employed to gesture toward-without prescription-all those changes in the contemporary world once registered as effects or exemplars of "late capitalism," "postmodernity," "globalization," "post-Fordism," "global assemblages," "neoliberalism,"
"hyperreality," "Empire," "dromology," the purported "end of history," the triumph of the "spectacle" or the "simulacrum," and the rise of "cyborg culture." Such terms-which combined indicate there is no single explicable model of globalization; rather there are myriad possible globalisms, or global imaginaries-come to us from numerous theorists- Virilio (1986 Virilio ( [1977 ), Lyotard (1979) , Eco (1983) , Baudrillard (1983) , 3 "with the acceleration of twenty-first century technology-let us recall Marinetti and the Futurists-it"s clear that we need a political economy of velocity. Our world is one of absolute velocity; … we have passed from the local and relative velocity of transport to the global and absolute velocity of transmissions …" Our translation. 4 "we have no need to search for things, everything comes to us." Our translation. 5 "I fear the advent of a sense of global claustrophobia, and flowing from this is one of the great ecological questions confronting future generations. The earth is too small for absolute velocity." Our translation. Harvey (1989) , Haraway (1991) , Jameson (1991) , Fukuyama (1992) , Debord (1994) , Baumann (1998) , Hardt and Negri (2000) , and Sassen (2006) -to mention some of the most influential figures in this arena of grand-narrative speculation and assertion. 6 In the view of these and many more critics, human life has entered a new age, one marked by the waning of History (with a capital H) as a hitherto unproblematic court of truth. In this age we encounter the hyper-acceleration and evanescence of global flows of culture, products, money, people, and even crime, diseases, and human-made pollution against a background of market totalitarianism, ethnic cleansing and growing religious militarism (Zionist, Islamic and Christian fundamentalist, Hindu Nationalist), processes that register in numerous, often contradictory, and yet potentially insurrectionary and surprising ways, as the following selected examples attest:
 the techno-intertextualization of the image and the word and the digitalization of communication, as announced by the digitally enhanced and filtered news reporting (from the USA) of armed conflicts (without corpses or carnage) since the first Gulf War;  the aestheticization of politics, perhaps best exemplified by the post-Cold War triumph of kitsch over totalitarian ideologies in post-Soviet Europe, a process also at work in the still-Communist world (Hoberman 1998; Abreu 2001; Allatson 2007a );  the post-Fordist restructuring of economies across the planet (Lipietz 1992; Ash 1994 ). This has not simply caused the immaterialization of labour (precarity) with the shift (in industrial economies) "from jobs based in industry to jobs based in the service industry, namely producing communication, information and knowledge"; it has also caused the immaterialization of goods, "such as affect, social relations and desire" (Tarì & Vanni 2005) . Another sign of postFordism is the "programming" of both labour and immigration so that working bodies in certain capitalist sectors (Indian call centres, for example) need no longer cross national lines to do their work or to be players in another state"s economy (Aneesh 2006) ;  the cyborgization of human bodies and genders, at least among those with the means to take corporeal and identificatory advantage of such technology (Haraway 1991) ;  the rise of downloadable modes of consumption, from shopping and entertainment to recording (and then relaying) the minutiae of daily experience (witness spectators at sporting, musical or any manner of public or private events paying mediated attention to proceedings as they make video mementoes on their cellular phones);  the conversion of the www into the main communicative venue of our epoch (despite, or perhaps, because of the hegemony of Cyberenglish) for finding information, assessing an individual"s "impact" or worth, and hosting a multitude of autobiographical (named and re/misnamed) fragments, CVs, wish-lists, desires, opinions, images, and personal me-too-bytes. Moreover, given that the cybertrawler"s imprints and tracks elude the best attempts at erasure, the www potentially forever chronicles the evidential data of a logged-on existence;  the simultaneous conversion of the www and other technologies into technologies of resistance, as typified by activist communities that use texting to facilitate rapid, impromptu mobilizations, and by the indigenous Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, which for a decade and a half has transmitted its communiqués and manifestoes via the www, accessed innovatively and clandestinely from power grids and telephone lines in forays from the movement"s jungle bases (Coronado & Hodge 2001) ;  the hosting by immigrant receiver states of transnational or satellite communities, which are connected by the telephone and the internet, routines of circular travel, creative neocultural adaptation to life in two (or more) states, and the sending of remittances. One example is the indigenous Mexican Mixtecs who have made California another home, in the process becoming Oaxacalifornios/ians (Kearney 2000; Cohen 2001 );  the amorphous reproduction of "terrorist" cells with no identifiable centralized order or command and, in direct response, the sequestering of purported enemy combatants in legal black holes outside the reach of national or international jurisdictions;  the technologization of national border security, from iris-recognition software at immigration-control desks to satellite and infrared surveillance along permeable frontiers. One example is the US-Mexico border, the busiest land frontier in the world, a key line in the region"s economic reorderings announced by NAFTA, and one along whose US side roam vigilantes opposed to ongoing undocumented immigration by workers from the south, and anti-vigilantes concerned to assist such workers and safeguard their welfare, hence one pundit"s description of it as a "hyperborder" (Romero 2007 ).  the rush for genomic patenting and copyrighting, the genetic modification of crops, and the inexorable reduction of access to diverse seed varieties faced by farmers across the globe, and not only in the so-called Third World, and a proactive glocal chain of market spaces in which such diversity is being preserved and re-circulated;  the accelerating rates of global warming and the reduction of biodiversity, and increasing deployment of new or refigured power-generating technologies to address those processes;  and so on … These tendencies-diverse, proliferating, intersecting, contradictory-seem to have advanced us further into a dizzying swirl of human activity-veritable hyperactivitythat is disorienting even for the most reliable of pundits and futurists keen to reveal and explain the future to us. Yet despite the confidence of the speculations made by numerous critics, we would suggest that economic and technological change may be running ahead of our ability to socially and culturally critique, let alone comprehend, their long-term effects.
How do these changes affect language, culture and history, which were once taken to reliably represent nations and their imagined communities? One need look no further than the managerial economic speak of "futures markets," "hedge funds" and "sub-prime mortgages," of discourses of war that seek to depersonalize life ("collateral damage") or project it into a pop cultural, Disney-fied, quasi-religious realm predetermined by Manichean logics ("evil empires"; "axis of evil"), or reduce it to absurdity ("false intelligence"). It is not so much that language is being debased here (as if it carried an inherent set of values beyond what we arbitrarily assign it), as it is reflecting the hierarchized power relations-and their selective, unpredictable logics of exclusion/inclusion-that underpin the contemporary world. As George Orwell once pointed out, the integrity of language depends on the integrity of those who use it: "Political language ... is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give the appearance of solidity to pure wind" (1946) .
It is important to note that even those communities or individuals seemingly outside, or left behind by, globalizing processes or mundializaciones (remote farming communities, indigenous peoples resisting state strictures of the singular nation-state community, developing nations, anyone or thing discarded by capitalist advancement) nevertheless suffer from, and yet are often enticed by, its economic, cultural and environmental effects and promises. There is no autarkic outside of contemporary hyperworld(s) (or whatever term may be used to describe current globalisms). It is also necessary to stress that technology and virtualization are not negative in, and of, themselves. They are merely ciphers for concrete political, economic and cultural changes under globalizations. Being against technology and globalisms or change itself is like being against oxygen. It makes no sense, and it is life-defeating. Indeed, one of the ironies of anti-globalization movements is their dependence on, and productive use of, global technologies, from mobile phones to the internet, as exemplified by the Zapatistas mentioned earlier.
What matters is what is said and done, and for whom, in the name of technology and globalization, to choose two words that for many people trigger visceral reactions, both positive and negative. As Jerry Everard argues, the question of uneven access to the technologies of hyperworldization-the "hypermedia" identified by Deibert (1997) -is perhaps better treated as a divergence between those who have, in a Foucauldian knowledge-equals-power sense, the means of knowing, and those who do not:
The distinction between haves and have nots in the information economy will be only in part a distinction of access to specific items of information. Rather the distinction will be one of access to a way of looking at the world. People without access to such technologies will find themselves increasingly less able to comprehend and to deal with the emerging changes in global economy. (Everard 2000: 161) Similar arguments have been made by Gabriela Coronado and Bob Hodge who, analyzing current claims that we have experienced a "virtual revolution," re-read Marx"s understandings of surplus value and ideology through an optical (virtual) lens:
Capitalism has developed a new array of devices to fulfill its old aim, to extract surplus value wherever it can. All these devices to some degree draw on resources of virtuality: "virtual surplus value" makes it easier to appropriate other kinds of surplus value .… Yet these are only the dreams of one class, shadows projected onto the screen of virtuality, which has space for many other projections. Outside the camera obscura of capitalist ideology the struggle continues, precarious or strong labour against strong or precarious capital, in a field of struggle unpredictably affected by new technologies of production and information. Virtuality has conditioned all forms of labour to some degree, creating different classes of worker, set against each other, not conscious of the web of virtuality that links them all into a single multitude. That unity is virtual in one sense-a potential that could be activated by virtuality in another sense, the resources of the net. The connections are not being made at the moment, by the real users who are the only ones who could make this grand alliance virtual, and thence real. But will they? (Coronado & Hodge 2005) The continuities that Coronado and Hodge identify between the virtualization of labour and surplus value today and the history of capitalist labour exploitation remind us to be wary of making "the virtual" into yet another grand narrative, the governing technology or metaphor of our epoch and its ills and possibilities. And as Nick Dyer Whiteford (1999) and Tiziana Terranova (2004) demonstrate, if there has been a "virtualtechnological revolution" in the current information age, then that revolution also opens up numerous options and spaces for new political struggles, resistances and insurgencies.
In our conception, then, hyperworld(s) cannot be contained by the term virtuality; it encompasses, exceeds, challenges, and devours it. The production of hyperworld(s), or hyperworldization, connotes acceleration and hyperactivity on social, economic and financial levels, the intensified commodification of most aspects of human life, the time-space compression of communication and much cultural production, the reordering of social relations themselves over-determined by technology wedded to capitalist market values, and, as a result, the re-ordering of daily life, cultural expression, and political activism for individuals and communities across the planet. Even human desire is inflected by the promises evoked by a virtual world. These processes and intensities mean that new modes of reading the interactive and contradictory discursive fragmentations of the current age are required. Thus, rather than regarding cyberspace as the age"s technological hallmark or dominant trope, we might make deeper sense of hyperworld(s)-the bracketed plural implying myriad intersecting worlds within "the" world-by identifying how the interactive logics of virtuality suggest narratorial entry points into contemporary lived historical-material and imagined complexities and potentials. As Mackenzie Wark wryly puts it, "the virtual is that world of the potential ways of life of which the way things are is just an instance" (1999: 11).
Useful here is Marie-Laure Ryan"s nuanced detailing of virtuality as narrative links, webs of interactive story-telling modes and discursive fragments that are continually renarrativized, reformatted, "upgraded," and even lost by cyberproducers and cyberconsumers alike (2001: 19). Ryan"s innovative reading of the virtual implies that "the real" consists of multiple narratives or "branching texts" across distinct, yet always potentially interlinked and cross-referenced, historical, geopolitical, socioeconomic, linguistic, and cultural times and spaces. Also useful for our purposes is Everard"s argument that "States are above all cultural artifacts," just as the internet is:
Another way of looking at this is to see states as information produced by and through practices of signification-from the writing of foundational documents (constitutions) to the discourses of smart bombs and the global spread of Coca-Cola. Sovereign identity, then, is comprised of bits, rather than atoms. (2000: 7) If states emerge as bits, bytes, networks, and flows, all of us, Everard claims, "are already living in virtual states," the state being "a legal fiction-an important one, but a fiction nonetheless," which hinges on its capacity to narrativize acceptable national identities-yet more bits, bytes, networks, and flows-in a bounded, finite space (2000: 152). For Everard, it is no coincidence that the word cyber "comes from the Greek "κυβερ," which means to steer, to discipline or to govern. So there is a sense of governance embodied within the term "cyberspace"" (152). But it is a tenuous sense of governance for states and the internet alike. In their very boundary-marking procedures states-paralleling the operations of cyberspace-conceal and reveal the ways by which they are ever-morphing narrative constructs. The state"s attempt to generate nationalized identities falters because it and its identities occupy a virtual (in the imaginary sense)
nowhere. The fate of states is to defer narrative crisis by maintaining the fiction that national ideals and identities can be retrieved intact and ready for deployment. The virtual trouble of nationality lies in the state"s inability to repress rival narratives of national or anti-and non-national potential, a point to which we will return with regard to the post-revolutionary struggles over the idea and fact of "Cuba." 7 How do Latin American critics conceptualize the recent transformations wrought by technological change, capitalist globalisms, and the transformation of state functionality? As opposed to the cheerleaders of neoliberalism and the notorious Washington Consensus, many social and cultural theorists view these changes with dismay. Néstor García Canclini, writing in 1999, finds it "curioso que esta disputa de todos contra todos, en la que van quebrando fábricas, se destrozan empleos y aumentan las migraciones masivas y los enfrentamientos y regionales, sea llamada globalización" (1999: 10). 8 In this scenario, the traditional public sphere of national politics and its regulatory capabilities no longer seem to function with "national" promise:
Al mismo tiempo que se la concibe como expansión de los mercados y, por tanto, de la potencialidad económica de las sociedades, la globalización estrecha la capacidad de acción de los Estados nacionales, los partidos, los sindicatos y en general los actores políticos clásicos. Produce mayor intercambio transnacional y deja tambaleando las certezas que daba el pertenecer a una nación. (1999: 21). That is to say, its many origins sustain its constant morphing in numerous worldly sites, with deep consequences for cultural signification in and beyond the Americas. Thus, if salsa is both "product and symptom of the globalization of culture," further challenges "to received notions of what "Latin/o" culture signifies in a globalized epoch are posed 12 The main centres of salsa production remain New York, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Colombia, although the genre has practitioners across the USA, in most Hispanophone countries, and in many nonHispanophone countries, including Australia.
by Japan"s Orquesta de la Luz, which emerged in the 1990s to international acclaim with songs such as "Salsa no tiene fronteras" (Salsa Has No Borders), and Salsa Celtica, a Scottish Celtic and salsa fusion band formed in 1996, which combines bagpipes and flute with Afro-Caribbean percussion" (Allatson 2007b: 208-9) .
A second example of musical morphing in the Americas is tango, a musical form considered in this special issue in Guillermo Anad"s "La nueva guarida del tango." The tango is archetypically associated with Argentina, another instance of country branding If the "hyper" in "hyperworld(s)" has relevance here, then, it is not only in terms of expanded speed, reach, links, and spatial dimensions-many of the standard dimensions of capitalist expansion since the industrial revolution and, as Virilio argues, of modern warfare and media structures (1986)-for it also extends to the liberal philosophical underpinning in which the individual is privileged over the collective. But whatever fantasies of freedom that hyperworld(s) might proffer the individual, "materialism cannot be completely overcome or ignored. The sting in the tail of the sustained trip into the hyperworld is increased stress in the real world of time, human relations and environmental well-being." 13 Moreover, hyperworld(s) themselves may become more disordered and dangerous, in eerie parallels of numerous science fictional accounts that depict societies careering out of control.
As noted earlier, such questions of control very much pertain to the nation, and in this issue are raised in two articles dealing with post-revolutionary Cuba. Like all national illusions, Cuba attains meaning in terms of its ability to generate a nationalized identity that might be called cubanidad, or Cubanness. 14 But the nation"s identity productions emerge, to borrow Nicole Stenger"s definition of cyberspace, from a place that like "Cyberspace, is like Oz-it is, we get there, but it has no location" (1991: 53). Virtually nowhere, Cuba operates in what is, to borrow again from Stenger, "a sort of atmospheric depression in history," concentrating in itself "aspirations for fundamental re-sourcing" (56). By this Stenger means data storage in the virtual realm and its interactive retrieval by cyberusers. But in the case of the Cuban nowhere, "re-sourcing" would also encompass rival (island, exile and other) aspirations to secure and maintain image-sets of national identity that can be retrieved ready for ideological deployment. Crónicas also builds implicitly on the chronicle-like characteristics of previous codeswitching and genre-blurring Chicana texts such as Gloria Anzaldúa"s influential 16 See the reference list of this essay for details of Monsiváis"s and Lemebel"s published collections of chronicles to date. For provocative analyses of Monsiváis see Egan (2001) , and for Lemebel see Palaversich (2002) and Poblete (2002) . (1987 demonstrates that code-switching between Spanish(es) and English is a progressive, creative elaboration grounded in the everyday. Chávez-Silverman"s crónica thus offers a neocultural insight into the lived realities of millions of US Latina/os, a testament to the fact that socioculturally neither Latin America nor the USA achieve definitional meaning and locational certainty at the US-Mexico border.
Borderlands/La Frontera
The final contribution to this special issue"s cultural works section is by Ian Campbell, an Australian poet who writes predominantly in Bahasa Indonesia, an unusual idiom for Australian writers despite Australia and Indonesia"s adjacency. As the title of the poetry suite included here attests-"Selatan-Sur-South"-Campbell"s poems meditate on the concept of the south as a contested spatialization and geocultural imaginary for diverse residents of the southern hemisphere. That focus is enabled, and encoded in, the poem"s internal geographic, literary and cultural references, which, like their places of authorship, shift seamlessly between sites in Australia, Indonesia and Latin America.
While Chávez-Silverman"s crónicas in part recreate the enunciative characteristics of peninsular, Argentinean and Chicana Spanishes as they tangle with US English, Campbell"s poetry enacts a trilingual translation between Indonesian, Australian and Latin American (Chilean, Argentinean) cultural fields and dominant languages. A case in point is his translation from Spanish to Indonesian of a famous poem by Francisco
Urondo , an homage to the great tango artist, Carlos Gardel, a name synonymous with the "Buenos Aires" city brand in the first few decades of the 20 th century. With his translation Campbell manages a deft rebranding of the tango, and its greatest exponent, for Indonesian readers. Noteworthy, too, is the selection"s concluding statement, "Lejano Sur (Ke Kejauhan Selatan) Further South." Incorporating references to Borges"s strict definition of where the south part of Buenos Aires begins, and the title from the Australian playwright Douglas Stewart"s "Fire on the Snow," Campbell here posits the "south" as "a land of dust/ where paradox reigned." It is an apposite summation of a set of poems that defies geocultural fixing as it links disparate parts of the "south" through transcultural interactions-bits, bytes, networks, flows-as befits the qualities of the hyperworld(s) into which we have forayed, exploratively, here.
